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Abstract 
This paper examines why the ICC indicting President 
Al Bashir has culminated in a rapid deterioration in 
relations between African countries and that transnational 
organization. The paper uses the atrocities the Sudanese 
government committed in Darfur to examine the 
disputatious issue of official immunity and whether 
President Al Bashir, as an incumbent head of state, should 
enjoy it. Irrespective of the merits and demerits of official 
immunity being extended to top public officials accused 
of crime, African leaders have shown a near unanimous 
disdain for the ICC since the organization began to push 
for President Bashir’s indictment. This paper examines to 
extent to which the ICC through its actions is blamable for 
precipitating the deteriorating relationship between itself 
and the AU. Alternatively, governments of the AU may 
not escape blame for capitalizing on the ICC’s awkward 
move on Bashir to rid themselves of an organization the 
international community set up to clamp down on human 
rights abusers throughout the world. There is no disguising 
that many African leaders feel gleeful for masterfully 
setting up a firewall that ostensibly blunts the ICC’s 
ability to use the long reach of the law to bring violators 
to justice. The ultimate losers of this break down of trust 
have been Africans who since the dawn of independence 
have been at the receiving end of governmental brutality 
and injustice. These are the poor, the working class, the 
politically unconnected, and people who dare raise their 
voice against corruption and egregious human rights 
abuses.
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INTRODUCTION
After the International Criminal Court (ICC) charged 
President Omar Al Bashir with war crimes in 2009, he 
made several overseas trips including to Ethiopia and 
Egypt. Nevertheless, it was his visit to South Africa from 
June 7 to June 15, 2015 as head of Sudan’s delegation 
to the African Union’s 25th African Union Summit that 
gained notoriety. The ICC petitioned the South African 
former president Jacob Zuma to arrest President Bashir. 
The ICC’s request unexpectedly came to dominate the 
summit. When President Al Bashir arrived for the summit 
a South African judge, Hans Fabricius, ordered the 
Sudanese president to remain in South Africa until a judge 
decided whether he would be arrested to face war crime 
charges at the International Criminal Court (Makhubu, 
2015). Amid all the confusion, a Sudanese embassy 
official, Saif Ahmed, said Khartoum seemed not bothered 
by the ICC’s move “The court has no authority on Sudan,” 
he said (Dube, 2015). When the summit ended, the South 
African government allowed the Sudanese president to 
leave the country. Tisdall reports that as Al Bashir’s plane 
took off from a military airfield outside Pretoria, the local 
high court was still hearing arguments over an application 
that would have forced the South African government to 
arrest him (Tisdall, 2015). A South African judge criticized 
the government for allowing Bashir to leave, while the 
ICC on its part gave the South African government up to 
early October to explain why it refused to arrest President 
Bashir.
The South African government went on the offensive, 
sternly rebuking the ICC and what it stands for. According 
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to Powell, the foreign minister, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, 
accused the organization of bias because “all nine of 
the situations the court is investigating are in Africa.” 
Moreover, the minister claimed that South Africa was not 
afforded the opportunity to present legal arguments on the 
application of why Al Bashir was not detained; hence, the 
principles of justice were not adhered to (Powell, 2015). 
In the view of South Africa’s government the ICC had 
committed a serious infringement of South Africa’s rights 
as a state and that the court had acted against the letter and 
spirit of the Rome Statute.
1. ICC’S CRITICS AND SUPPORTERS
There were supporters and critics of the South African 
government’s inaction to arrest Al Bashir. Writing in 
the New York Times, Sengupta and Simons stated the 
ICC lacking support since 2002 was because the law 
protects only those who have powerful friends, singling 
out former American president George Bush for escaping 
the atrocities invading Iraq created (Sengupta & Simons, 
2015). Ankomah described the controversy surrounding 
the South African government agreeing first to detain Al 
Bashir as a case of “mistaken memory.” The statement 
sarcastically implored Africans to open their eyes to the 
danger that outsiders pose to the stability of the continent 
and its institutions. Ankomah was incredulous there were 
people in South Africa who wanted their government to 
ignore the collective voice of Africans (who he claimed 
did not want Al Bashir arrested) so some Westerners could 
rejoice (Ankomah, 2015). 
Deon (2015), on the other hand, argued that South 
Africa was becoming a rogue state because the ANC’s 
claim the ICC was biased was false and pure political 
posturing. “In the eyes of the African leaders, the ICC 
is biased…only Africans they are interested in. This 
is what has made Africa feel we need to reconsider 
our participation. It looks like it is just meant for us.” 
According to Deon, a closer look at the ICC’s caseload 
suggests nothing biased in the court’s approach to Africa 
even though President Zuma tried to use the “biased” 
argument to announce a plan to withdraw South Africa 
from the ICC. The Economist (2015) also asserted in 
an article that the late South African leader, Nelson 
Mandela’, legacy had been tarnished by the South African 
government’s failing to arrest President Omar Bashir who 
had been indicted by the ICC for genocide. According to 
the article, the South African government allowing Omar 
Al Bashir to return home safely after the African Union 
summit harmed international justice.
President Al Bashir’s nonchalant behavior about 
the ICC’s indictment was a vivid reflection of the ill-
boding contempt the AU has had for the ICC for targeting 
African leaders—a targeting which many leaders believe 
has been unfairly applied. In a resolution passed at the 
Extraordinary Session of the Assembly in October 2013, 
the Assembly reiterated its unflinching commitment to 
fight impunity, promote human rights and democracy, 
and the rule of law and good governance in the continent. 
The AU, however, reiterated that it stood by its earlier 
resolution that no sitting African head of state should be 
tried before the ICC (Extraordinary Session, 2013). 
The basis for the AU’s seemingly duplicitous 
stance toward the ICC stemmed from the organization 
much publicized effort to indict Uhuru Kenyatta, the 
incumbent President of Kenya. Uhuru Kenyatta, who was 
the former Minister of Finance and William Ruto, the 
Secretary-General of KANU, were charged as indirect 
co-perpetrators in the violence which erupted during 
Kenya’s 2007 presidential elections. The charges were 
five counts of crimes against humanity consisting of 
murder, deportation or forcible transfer, rape, persecution 
and other inhumane acts allegedly committed during the 
post-election violence between 2007 and 2008. Other 
high-ranking Kenyan government officials were also 
indicted. In March 2011, the ICC decided to call up Uhuru 
Kenyatta and two other co-conspirators to appear at The 
Hague, which the suspects voluntarily did in April, 2011. 
2. THE GENESIS OF DISTRUST
Africans have a deep distrust of their political institutions. 
Studies in the Afrobarometer on the subject in sub-Saharan 
Africa show citizens’ wariness for governments seen to be 
corrupt (Razafindrakoto & Roubaud, 2008). It may seem 
reasonable to extrapolate citizens’ distrust of political 
institutions to governments’ distrust of international 
institutions but there are no empirical studies ascertaining 
this link. Based on the resentment some African leaders 
have shown for international organizations especially 
those championing causes for human rights, however, 
it would be naïve to suggest a deep-seated distrust for 
these organizations did not exist. Analyses of a cross-
section of individuals using micro-data from the World 
Values Survey on trust in international organizations, 
specifically trust in the United Nations, suggest that socio-
demographic, socio-economic factors and politics have an 
impact on citizens’ beliefs. Political trust at the state level 
leads to a higher trust at the international level (Torgler, 
2008). Rational-choice and structural functional theories 
in the context of international politics suggest a reasonable 
expectation among Third World leaders harboring a 
fundamental suspicion for international organizations. 
The relationship that had existed between Omar Bashir 
and the ICC had been predicated on distrust as Bashir 
perspectively saw nothing but doom if he lent his support 
for an organization dedicated to putting human rights 
abusers on trial. The Sudanese government intuitively 
never signed the Rome Statute. Omar Bashir’s resentment 
toward the ICC, indeed, the general distrust other African 
leaders have shown human rights organizations, therefore, 
must be understood in the context of governments seeing 
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themselves as potential victims of a conspiracy to bring 
their character and that of top associates into disrepute. 
Dependency theorists like Amin (1976) and Cordoso 
(1972) have laid a strong theoretical foundation to 
contextualize the instinctive skepticism which leaders 
of developing countries have about the plots developed 
countries conceive to keep developing economic, social, 
and political systems in a state of permanent suspension. 
According to Wallerstein (2006), Gunder Frank, an early 
dependistas, suggested the situation in which Third World 
countries found themselves today was not the result of 
some “traditional” characteristics they had inherited but 
the result of their incorporation as “dominated”, and 
“exploited” sectors in the modern world system. Leaders, 
both dead and living including Gaddafi, Eyadema, 
Mugabe, Bashir and Neto who international organizations 
had long targeted for  human r ights  abuses had 
fundamental suspicions about human rights organizations. 
3. THE HORROR IN DARFUR
The International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur 
(ICID) examined reports from different sources including 
government, intergovernmental organizations, non-
governmental organizations, and interviews with victims 
and private individuals to prepare the charges against 
President Omar Al Bashir. To be sure, the ICID charged 
other groups including the Janjaweed, individuals, senior 
government officials, military commanders, members of 
rebel groups, and certain foreign army officers that aided 
in planning and committing crimes against the people of 
Darfur. Based on the ICID’s report, the ICC issued two 
warrants for Bashir’s arrest. 
The first issued on March 4, 2009 lists crimes that 
include five counts of crimes against humanity, murder, 
extermination, forcible transfer, torture and rape. Two 
counts of war crimes: Intentionally directing attacks 
against a civilian population or against individual 
civilians not taking part in hostilities, and pillaging. Three 
counts of genocide: genocide by killing, genocide by 
causing serious bodily or mental harm and genocide by 
deliberately inflicting on each target group conditions 
of life calculated to bring about the group’s physical 
destruction (ICC, 2009). 
The ICC, upon investigation, came up with what it 
asserted were two irrefutable facts about the situation 
in Darfur. First, according to United Nations estimates, 
there were 1.65 million internally displaced people in 
Darfur and more than 200,000 refugees from Darfur in 
neighboring Chad. Second, there had been large-scale 
destruction of villages throughout the three states of 
Darfur. The ICC conducted independent investigations 
to establish additional facts and gathered extensive 
information on multiple incidents of violations affecting 
villages, towns and other locations across North, South 
and West Darfur. 
Based on an analysis of the information gathered 
in the course of its investigations, the ICC concluded 
the Government of the Sudan and the Janjaweed were 
responsible for serious violations of international human 
rights and humanitarian law amounting to crimes under 
international law. In particular, the ICC found that 
Government forces and militias conducted indiscriminate 
attacks, including killing of civilians, torture, enforced 
disappearances, destroying villages, rape and other forms 
of sexual violence, pillaging and forced displacement 
throughout Darfur. The extensive destruction and 
displacement resulted in loss of livelihood and means of 
survival for countless women, men and children. Besides 
the large scale attacks, many people had been arrested and 
detained, and many held incommunicado for prolonged 
periods and tortured (Milanovic, 2008). Sudanese 
government officials have stated that any attacks carried 
out by Government armed forces in Darfur were for 
counter-insurgency purposes and conducted by military 
imperatives (Taylor, 2008).
A 2005 UNICEF reports identified the crisis in Darfur 
to be the world’s worst complex emergency, characterized 
by widespread insecurity, population displacement 
and dependence on humanitarian aid. According to the 
report, over 210,000 refugees remained in Chad while 
the total conflict affected population in Darfur rose to 
approximately 2.4 million persons. According to UNICEF, 
approximately 1.4 million of these groups were children 
under 18 years of age and 550,000 were under five years 
old. These children were vulnerable to the effects of 
violence, abuse, hunger, disease and exploitation during 
the increasing social and economic collapse. The report 
concluded that the Government of Sudan had not pursued 
a policy of genocide but that the grave crimes committed 
in Darfur “may be no less serious and heinous than 
genocide”. The commission recognized however that 
some individuals, including government officials, might 
have committed acts with genocidal intent (UNICEF, 
2005). The ICC identified several top government 
officials and military commanders including Ahmad 
Harun Ali Kushayb, Abdel Raheem Mohammad Hussein, 
and Abdallah Banda for actively participating in the crime 
against the people of Darfur. 
Apsel (2009) asserts Darfur was not an isolated case 
that suddenly erupted in violence. Rather, it followed a 
long history of repeated violations by the Sudanese state 
against its citizens including using proxy militias (the 
Janjaweed) to sign peace agreements that fragmented and 
weakened the opposition. The root of the conflict was 
multiethnic and multicausal as the Sudanese government 
with speed uprooted millions of its citizens in 2003-2005 
from their homes. This restructuring of the population 
in Darfur was part of a strategy to control the populace 
and redistribute land and other resources. Reyna attributes 
the conditions in Darfur worsening to Omar-Al Bashir, an 
Arab, coming to power in a military coup in 1989 as he 
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quickly entered an alliance with the Islamist movement, 
the National Islamic Front (NIF), led by Hassan al-Turabi, 
a radical Islamic ideologue. 
Al-Turabi was behind introducing Sharia law in 
South Sudan, a non-Islamic region. As chairman of the 
legislative committee and subsequently Attorney General, 
he was in a position to influence government policy. 
Turabi also was a supporter of Osama bin Laden and 
was behind his invite to live in Sudan (Reyna, 2010). 
Al Bashir’s new regime immediately posed problems 
in Darfur, especially for non-Arab peoples as it divided 
Darfur in 1994 into three smaller states—North, West 
and South Darfur to make certain that boundaries were 
gerrymandered to make the Fur a minority in each of 
the states, decreasing Fur power. A year later the central 
government appointed eight Arab emirs in West Darfur 
that directly threatened Masalit authority in their West 
Darfurian heartland. 
3.1 The Controversy About Official Immunity
Immunity is defined as the exception or exclusion of the 
entity, individual or property from prosecution. The 1961 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes 
against Internationally Protected Persons which came into 
force in February 1977, grants Heads of State including 
any member of a collegial body performing the roles of a 
Head of State under the constitution of the State concerned 
immunity ratione materiae, or functional immunity, for 
official acts committed as part of one‘s duties while in 
office (Convention, 1977). Incumbent leaders continually 
committing atrocities against their citizens, however, 
have raised questions about the propriety of head of states 
invoking total immunity for their actions. 
According to Foakes (2011), the question about what 
to do with heads of states who commit crimes has led 
to developing a universal jurisdiction for international 
crimes. This principle allows the national authorities of 
any state to investigate and prosecute people for serious 
international crimes such as genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, and torture even if they were 
committed in another country. Acting on that principle, 
human rights groups have made several unsuccessful 
tries to prosecute leaders including the former president 
of Chile, Augusto Pinochet and US officials for crimes 
committed in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Rome Statute of 
1998 which set up the ICC was the defining achievement 
human rights groups had sought after many years to 
enshrine universal jurisdiction as a commonly accepted 
principle in international law. Article 27 of the ICC statute 
was clear: 
This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any 
distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official 
capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a 
Government or parliament, an elected representative or a 
government official shall in no case exempt a person from 
criminal responsibility under this Statute. (Rome Statute, para.3, 
1999-2000)
Applying the principle of universal jurisdiction, 
however, has not been without controversy—a controversy 
that has undermined the ICC’s effort to arrest Al Bashir. 
One is whether Bashir, as incumbent head of state, could 
be subject to prosecution irrespective of the crimes he 
purportedly has committed. Akande and Shah (2010) 
disagree, asserting that international law according head 
of states and some top level officials immunity ratione 
personae in foreign courts for international crime may 
not be changed. Bohien (2010) also admits that practical 
problems may prevent justice from being served through 
the ICC such as the Sudanese government not being a 
signatory to the Rome Statute. Besides, as an independent 
body, the ICC relies on state cooperation for enforcement 
of its rulings and the Sudanese government has no wish to 
extradite Al Bashir who is the head of that government.
Article 98(2) of the Rome Statute forbids the Court 
from proceeding with a request for surrender which would 
require the requested State to act inconsistently with 
its obligations under international agreements pursuant 
to which the consent of a sending State is required to 
surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the 
Court can first obtain the cooperation of the sending 
State for the giving of consent for the surrender. Kiyani 
(2013) concurs that past precedents and customary 
international law undermine the ICC’s position to indict 
Al Bashir because sitting heads of states have traditionally 
had “personal” immunity, whether this immunity is jus 
cogens. This immunity applies whether the head of State 
is traveling or not, and whether he or she is abroad for 
government business or private purposes. Therefore, head 
of State immunity is more comprehensive than diplomatic 
immunity or ordinary functional immunities. 
President Al Bashir’s other claim to immunity stems 
from Sudan not being a signatory to the Rome Statute and 
therefore exempt from ICC prosecution. Laughland (2009) 
asserts that President Bashir must not be subjected to ICC 
jurisdiction because Sudan is not a signatory to the Rome 
Statute. Nowhere in the ICC Charter, he argues, does it 
say that the Court has jurisdiction over states which have 
not accepted that jurisdiction. Therefore the judges should 
not have concluded that it does. Besides, he asserts, an 
important and widely accepted principle of international 
law is that treaties should be interpreted with the utmost 
good faith in the sense they were meant. On one hand, 
states agreed to pool some of their powers on a voluntary 
basis to allow a body to which they had delegated powers to 
exercise those powers. On the other, it is a different matter 
if the body thus created claims powers over states which 
are not parties to it, and which have not given their consent.
3.2 Bashir’s Other Alibis
In September 2015, Al Bashir visited the People’s 
Republic of China during that country’s anniversary 
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of the end of World War II. The Chinese President Xi 
Jinping welcomed him as an “old friend” and invited him 
to a military parade. He went to India one month later to 
attend the India-Africa Summit. The Indian government 
rebuffed the ICC’s entreaty to arrest Al Bashir, stating 
the country was under no duty to arrest him as India was 
not a party to the Rome Statute. China and India inviting 
Omar Al Bashir in his capacity as Sudan’s head of state, 
dealt an embarrassing blow to the ICC’s credibility as an 
organization whose prosecutorial powers governments 
must respect. 
Legal precedents appear to lend credence to President 
al Bashir’s immunity from prosecution even if he did not 
directly reference them. One is the bilateral immunity 
agreement, also known as Article 98 Agreements, which the 
United States negotiated with individual countries soon after 
the Rome Statute entered into force.1 The Agreement was 
intended to shield American citizens from the jurisdiction 
of the ICC. Besides, a UK court rejecting a request in 2004 
to issue a warrant for the arrest of President Robert Mugabe 
of Zimbabwe, set a precedent that has become significant 
in the ICC’s warrant to have Al Bashir’s arrested. Peter 
Tatchell, a human rights campaigner, had twice tried to 
perform a citizen’s arrest on President Mugabe for human 
rights abuses but in 2004, Magistrate Timothy Workman, 
ruled that Mugabe was entitled to immunity as a head of 
state (Andrews, 2004). Buzzard (2009) agreed with the 
court’s position arguing that the absolute immunity a Head 
of State, as embodying the sovereign power of the state 
enjoyed has evolved over time.
Torg le r  (2008)  a rgues  tha t  a l though  UNSC 
Resolutions 1593 and 1970 sought to remove head of 
state immunity, the customary immunity Al Bashir and 
Mouamar Gaddafi (now deceased) enjoyed would not 
be removed. Above all, the legal obligations Resolutions 
1593 and 1970 placed on States to arrest relevant state 
officials were unlikely to be enforced. Wardle (2011) 
reiterates in his essay that Al Bashir remains protected 
by head of State immunity, and that ICC jurisdiction over 
him could only be maintained through either the Security 
Council overriding customary international law rules of 
treaties and immunities, or the law of immunities already 
provides an exception that invalidates Al Bashir’s 
protection. The latter simply does not exist and 
underscores why both propositions are unsustainable and 
require considerable revision of public international law. 
1 Several versions of these bilateral agreements have been 
implemented: those that are reciprocal, providing that neither of 
the two parties to the accord would surrender the other’s “persons” 
without first gaining consent from the other’; those that are non-
reciprocal, providing only for the non-surrender to the ICC of U.S. 
“persons”; and those that are intended for states that have neither 
signed nor ratified the Rome Statute. US Bilateral Immunity or 
So-called Article 98 Agreements. The Global Policy Forum. 18 
April 2003. https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/
article/164/28427.html
3.3 Flipped Loyalty
African countr ies  have enthusias t ica l ly  jo ined 
international organizations since the dawn of nations’ 
independence. Countries still look up to international 
organizations as the vehicle to restore justice and promote 
development. African governments that signed the Rome 
Statute saw setting up the ICC a hopeful antidote to 
years of human rights abuses that leaders had perpetrated 
against their own people. The governments that signed 
the Rome Statute showed genuine optimism from their 
action because for the first time in modern history 
countries had come to terms to establish an organization 
endowed with power to hold governments and their 
leaders accountable for behaving badly. Thirty-four out 
of fifty-three sovereign African countries signing was 
evidence of this optimism. 
Several African countries drafted legislation that 
incorporated the crimes the Rome Statute had listed 
that represented a prima facie evidence for indictment 
against those who committed those crimes. National 
laws incorporated the ICC’s high judicial standards to 
ensure that signatory nations and the ICC were on the 
same accord (“Africa and the ICC,” 2002). At the same 
time, twenty African countries including Sudan, Egypt, 
Ethiopia, Angola, Somalia, the Republic of Congo, and 
Central African Republic abstained from signing the 
Rome Statute. The abstentions were disconcerting for 
their symbolism as they showed that some governments 
were disinclined to embrace the new era of committing to 
respect human rights. 
Governments that signed the Rome Statute in the 
early 2000s, undoubtedly, were flaunting their democratic 
credentials by reassuring the world they were committed 
to turning a new page. The timing of the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU) changing to become the African 
Union (AU) in 1999 was also significant, because it 
was the same year the Rome Statute took effect. The 
newly-created AU was eager to showcase to the world 
the recently created African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights as its watchdog for human rights. The 
AU initially raised no objections to African countries 
assenting to the Rome Statute as a prelude to joining the 
ICC. The era when the OAU paraded narcissistic human 
rights abusers like Idi Amin and Jean-Bedel Bokassa 
reigned seemed a distant memory. 
When the UN raised alarm about the rapidly worsening 
situation in Darfur in 2003, the AU warmly welcomed 
the idea of stopping the atrocities which the Sudanese 
government and armed militias were perpetrating on 
people. In 2004, the UN Security Council Resolution 1564 
set up the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which 
approved setting up a modest peacekeeping operation in 
Darfur of 150 troops that increased to 7,000 in a few years. 
Since 2005, NATO has provided support at the request of 
the AU. The AU and the United Nations embarked on a 
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joint effort to prevent millions of Darfurians from starving 
by flying nine out of ten planes into the besieged territory 
(Fint, 2007). In 2007, UNSC Resolution 1769 set up the 
African Union/UN hybrid operation in Darfur, UNAMID, 
which took over from AMIS in late 2007. The budget of 
UNAMID was US$1.04 billion for the fiscal year 2016-
2017, and the strength of all uniformed personnel in 
Darfur stood at 17,754 (UNAMID, 2017). 
4. INDICTMENTS AND CONVICTIONS
The AU accepted and even encouraged the ICC to indict 
and send to trial lower military and administrative 
officials. From 2005 to 2009 when the ICC indicted 
twelve Africans including Joseph Kony, Raska Likwiya, 
and Okot Odhiambo on assorted charges of human rights 
abuses, the AU did not object. No government however 
has been as compliant as the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) for handing over war criminals to the 
ICC. More than six militia leaders from that country 
accused of various crimes of war have been indicted or 
tried at The Hague, according to Human Rights Watch. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Germain Katanga and Bosco 
Ntaganda were in the custody of the ICC but Sylvestre 
Mudacumura remained at large. The prosecution applied 
for a warrant for the arrest of Lubanga and Katanga in 
June 2007, both of whom were transferred into detention 
in February 2008. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo was found 
guilty in March 2012 of the crimes of enlisting and 
conscripting children under the age of 15 years and using 
them to take part actively in hostilities. He was sentenced 
in July 2012 to 14 years of imprisonment. Katanga 
whose trial began in November 2009 was sentenced in 
November 2012 to 12 years for crimes that include being 
an accessory to murder in 2003, even though the sentence 
was reduced to three years because of good behavior 
and has since been released (“ICC/DRC: Second Trial,” 
2009). 
In late 2015, the ICC transferred Germain Katanga 
and Thomas Lubanga from The Hague to finish serving 
their sentences in the DRC. This was the first time the 
ICC appointed a state to carry out a sentence imposed by 
the ICC because both men had expressed a preference 
for serving time in their home country. Another DRC 
warlord on trial at The Hague was Bosco Ntaganda, 
who surrendered himself voluntarily to the US Embassy 
in Rwanda in March 2013 and has been in ICC’s care 
since. His charges consist of 13 counts of war crimes 
that include murder and attempted murder; attacking 
civilians; rape; and sexual slavery of civilians. Ntaganda’s 
trial at The Hague began in September 2015 and is still 
continuing. 
In July 2008, the Belgian government transferred 
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo to the ICC. Bemba was 
President and Commander in Chief of the Mouvement 
de libération du Congo (MLC), which allegedly was 
criminally responsible for war crimes that include 
rape, torture and murder, and crimes against humanity 
including humiliating and degrading treatment in the 
Central African Republic. The trial of Bembo and his 
four associated began in September 2015 at the Hague.2 
In January 2004, the Ugandan government referred to 
the ICC a case involving Joseph Kony, the leader of the 
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a guerrilla group that had 
committed heinous crimes in that country. In September 
2005, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber issued a warrant for the 
arrest of Joseph Kony for crimes he had committed, as 
well as warrants for the arrest of four other persons named 
in the Prosecutor’s application (“The Prosecutor v. Joseph 
Kony,” 2005). 
The AU never raised objection to the United Nations 
when the Sierra Leonean government asked the Security 
Council in August 2000 to “try and bring to justice the 
members of the Revolutionary United Front and their 
accomplices responsible for committing crimes against 
the people of Sierra Leone.” The Security Council 
adopted Resolution 1315 (2000) that asked the Secretary-
General to negotiate an agreement with the Government 
of Sierra Leone. In response the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone (SCSL) which was created in 2002 indicted 
Charles Taylor, the president of Liberia, who had just 
been removed from office by insurgents for his role 
in providing help for rebels in Sierra Leone. Holding 
Taylor’s trial in Sierra Leone raised security concerns, so 
the SCSL conducted the trial at the ICC in t
he Hague. In April 2012, Taylor was found guilty 
of five counts of crimes against humanity, five counts 
of war crimes and one count of other serious violations 
of international humanitarian law perpetrated by Sierra 
Leone’s Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels. He 
was sentenced to fifty years in prison (“Special Court for 
Sierra Leone,” 2014). 
Laurent Gbagbo is another former head of state on trial 
at The Hague for crimes committed during Cote d’Ivoire’s 
civil war for refusing to stand down after losing the 2010 
elections. Although Gbagbo was already in custody, 
the ICC prosecutor applied for a warrant for his arrest 
in October 2011 and was transferred to ICC’s custody 
in November 2011. He has been charged as the former 
President of Côte d’Ivoire that bore individual criminal 
responsibility as an indirect co-perpetrator for four counts 
of crimes against humanity committed during the post-
electoral violence from December 2010 to April 2011. His 
trial began in 2016 (The Prosecutor v Laurent Gbagbo, 
2011). 
2 The cases involving DRC nationals are: The Prosecutor v. Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo; the Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda; the Prosecutor 
v. Germain Katanga; the Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui; The 
Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana; and The Prosecutor v. 
Sylvestre Mudacumura. Case Information Sheet: Situation in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Prosecutor v. The Accused 
(Thomas Lubanga Dyilo et al.) ICC-01/04-01/06.
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5. RATIONALIZING AFRICA’S ICC’S 
REBUKE
The AU becoming reticent about supporting the ICC’s 
effort to arrest President Al Bashir and bringing him to 
trial is an unexplainable turnabout to the organization’s 
early policy of cooperating with the UN to bring the 
perpetrators of the atrocities in Darfur to account. 
The seemingly dichotomous welcome the AU has 
begun giving the ICC underscores the complicity the 
organization has shown to human rights organizations 
since the 1960s. The AU’s promise of holding member 
governments accountable to keep the highest standards in 
human dignity has not always materialized when it comes 
to renouncing leaders who had ignored basic standards 
in human dignity. When an external human rights agency 
such as the ICC therefore tries to take aggressive steps 
to bring wayward leaders in line, it is bound to face 
resistance. If the AU were to allow the ICC to freely 
indict African leaders, it would be tantamount to willingly 
allowing a cloud of uncertainty permanently to hang over 
their heads. 
It is not hard to figure out why African leaders have 
become intransigent in complying with ICC demands 
with regards to indicting and sending additional African 
leaders to stand trial at The Hague. The current crop of 
African leaders believe it is about time they drew the line 
beyond which they would never cross allowing the ICC 
to cherry-pick from their ranks ostensibly to face trial. If 
standing up to the ICC potentially ruins their reputation as 
upholders of human rights, so be it. Leaders believe that if 
they stand aloof the ICC would decimate their ranks under 
a false guise of upholding justice. Acquiescing to the 
ICC would be akin to signing a death wish to a faceless 
transnational organization. Standing in solidarity with the 
AU in its condemnatory stance against the ICC, many 
African leaders believed, was the best strategy to use 
to confront an organization that might not have the best 
interest of Africans at heart. 
The dichotomy in the AU’s approach to the ICC has 
become evident as governments of countries such as 
Ghana and Senegal that have respectable human rights 
record have not been as condemnatory of the ICC as 
the rest of Africa has. On the contrary, Zimbabwe and 
The Gambia when they were headed by Robert Mugabe 
and Yahya Jammeh, respectively, never lent support for 
work the ICC was doing. International human rights 
organizations consistently criticized the two leaders 
for their deplorable human rights record. President 
Mugabe defended his human rights record as pristine and 
referred to the frequent criticism of him by human rights 
organizations as nothing short of an institutional witch 
hunt against him. It was only a few days into his tenure 
as the newly-appointed AU Chairman in early 2015 when 
President Mugabe claimed the ICC was unfairly targeting 
Africans. 
President Mugabe’s pugnacity toward the ICC seemed 
preemptive because since the mid-1980s, he left a long 
trail of human rights abuses which only a handful of his 
contemporaries equaled. This ranged from sending the 
national army to go to Ndebeleland to commit atrocities 
against the supporters of his chief opponent (McGregor, 
2002), expropriating land belonging to white farmers 
(Shaw, 2003), and using security forces to intimidate 
voters in elections (Ranger, 1992). Although for three 
decades global human rights organizations like Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch regularly criticized 
Mugabe’s authoritarian rule. Those organizations lacking 
the power to make arrests made their criticism of leaders 
for abuses irrelevant.
Iconoclastic leaders of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya 
being dishonorably swept away through people’s power 
in 2011 in the Arab Spring, has made African leader 
insecure about similar circumstances happening to them. 
In October 2014, reverberations from the Arab Spring 
were felt in Burkina Faso when the country’s long-
serving leader, Blaise Compaoré, was ousted through 
street demonstrations. Now living in exile in Cote d’Ivoire 
and his reputation in tatters, his credibility was further 
damaged following a botched coup attempt by presidential 
guards in September 2015, allegedly carried out to restore 
him to power. In December 2015, a military court in 
Burkina Faso issued an international arrest warrant for the 
ousted president over the assassination of Capt. Thomas 
Sankara, the country’s former revolutionary leader, with 
twelve of his supporters in 1987 (“Burkina Faso Issues,” 
2015).
6. ESCAPISTS MOVES BY RIGHTS 
VIOLATORS 
Undoubtedly, observers who were hopeful just one decade 
ago that African governments embracing the ICC marked 
the beginning of a new era of open government and 
respect for human rights might be disappointed countries 
that enthusiastically supported the organization would 
threaten to withdraw their membership. On the practical 
side, human rights violations on the continent have not 
ended as electoral violence and suppression of political 
dissent continue unabated. The rationale behind the 
governments of Gambia, Burundi, and Kenya announcing 
their withdrawal from the ICC may only be fully 
understood in the context of those governments trying 
to erect a barrier to stop the ICC investigating any rights 
violations in those countries. These governments see the 
ICC as the only organization that has the legal authority to 
entreat governments to hand over high ranking officials to 
stand trial for human rights violations. 
Wanton arrests in Burundi in the aftermath of the 2015 
election prompted calls to the UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights to inquire about human rights abuses in 
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that country. The United Nations subsequently established 
the UN Independent Investigation on Burundi in a special 
resolution (S-24/1 of September 20, 2016). The Human 
Rights Watch putting President Nkurunziza on notice 
about human rights abuses during the July 2015 elections 
in Burundi, prompted lawmakers in the country by a very 
wide margin to vote in March 2017 to withdraw from the 
ICC (“Burundi Votes to Leave,” 2016). The first country 
officially to do so. In one report among many by the 
HRW, Burundian authorities were accused of targeting 
perceived opponents with increased brutality. Government 
forces were killing, abducting, torturing, and arbitrarily 
arresting scores of people at an alarming rate. The report 
called on the UN Security Council to press for the 
deployment of international police presence in Burundi 
(“Exposing Burundi’s Human Rights,” 2016).
In October 2016, Yahya Jammeh, the former President 
of Gambia decided to withdraw his country from the 
ICC. Jammeh’s Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and 
Construction party that controlled parliament issued a 
statement to explain that dramatic decision. The party 
accused the ICC of ‘persecution and humiliation of 
people of color, especially Africans.’ Yahya Jammeh had 
an ignominious human rights record and was widely 
condemned in a 2010 report by the US Department of 
State. The report recalled Yahya Jammeh since taking 
over power in 1994 ruthlessly repressing all forms of 
dissent. State security forces and shadowy paramilitary 
groups carried out unlawful killings and arbitrary 
arrests, detained, and made people forcibly disappear 
(2010 Human Rights Report). Jammeh’s populist action 
in removing his country from the ICC just before the 
elections was designed to win him votes—he lost. In 
January 2017, Gambia’s new government led by President 
Adamah Barrow announced that it would not only halt 
proceedings to leave the ICC but also would rejoin the 
British Commonwealth.
In October 2016, Kenya’s parliament reaffirmed its 
second vote in as many years to withdraw its membership 
from the ICC. Kenya’s first vote to leave the ICC 
occurred in 2013. These votes were a demoralizing act 
by a country that gave an early endorsement to the ICC’s 
ideal. Kenya signed the Rome Statute in August 1999 and 
acceded the ICC treaty in March 2005. Without a doubt, 
Kenya signaling to leave the ICC was precipitated by the 
string of indictments the ICC had handed to high-ranking 
Kenyan officials, including President Uhuru Kenyatta 
for the electoral violence in 2007. The AU’s reacted 
disapprovingly to the ICC charging President Kenyatta 
and his deputy, William Ruto’s, to appear before the court 
at The Hague. In its Extraordinary Session in October 
2013, the AU issued a statement condemning the ICC’s 
move:
Reiterat(ing) the AU’s concern on the politicization and misuse 
of indictments against African leaders by ICC as well as at the 
unprecedented indictments of and proceedings against the sitting 
President and Deputy President of Kenya in light of the recent 
developments in that country (Extraordinary Session, 2013). 
The statement noted further that was the first time that 
a sitting Head of State and his deputy were being tried in 
an international court and that behavior could undermine 
the sovereignty, stability, and peace of Kenya and in other 
Member States. The AU’s statement highlighted Kenya’s 
frontline role among states in the fight against terrorism at 
regional, continental and international levels. In December 
2014, however, the Prosecution withdrew the charges 
against the Kenyan leader, after which President Kenyatta 
expressed relief. It is not coincidental that some African 
leaders want the ICC to end its work on African soil. The 
specific actions those governments have taken reflect a tit-
for-tat tactic aimed at making the ICC irrelevant. 
7. AN OBSERVATION
It may be much easier to understand the testy relationship 
that has emerged between African countries and the ICC 
on the presumption that a relationship forged between 
a supranational organization and a motley collection of 
countries about enforcing international law on important 
persons was doomed to sour. The interests between the 
African countries and the ICC have progressively diverged 
and would require considerable amount of discovery 
from both sides to resuscitate it. One of the parties is 
a relentless prosecutor wanting to institute justice; the 
other, prospective defendants who are prone to commit 
infractions. African governments showed qualified 
goodwill for the ICC because they recognized the value 
in the work it was doing. Nevertheless, governments have 
been apprehensive about overselling their hospitableness 
to the point of making it easy for the ICC to access 
damnable information as grounds for indictment. African 
governments have been unable to keep high human rights 
standards. It has not been for lack of trying but due to 
the uncertainty in political circumstances between ruling 
governments and opposition groups.  
Longsuffering Africans who have lived under 
oppressive regimes and likely to do so in the future may 
be the biggest losers from the deteriorating relationship 
developing between their governments and the ICC. The 
international community set up the ICC to end the sort 
of atrocities of which President Omar Bashir has been 
accused. Nevertheless, in spite of the well-documented 
charges the ICC has compiled including complicity in 
terminating half a million Darfurians, President Bashir 
walks free. Above all, he enjoys unprecedented support 
not only from the people of Sudan but the AU at large. 
The AU backing President Bashir in his confrontation 
with the ICC has exposed the organization as an 
undedicated enforcer of human rights. African Heads of 
States adopting the Malabo Protocol (2016) gave a veiled 
warning to the ICC any other international organization to 
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tread carefully when it seeks to convict African leaders. 
The Protocol partly states: 
No charges shall be commenced or continued before the Court 
against any serving African Union Head of State or Government, 
or anybody acting or entitled to act in such capacity or other 
senior state officials based on their functions during their tenure 
of office. 
The Malabo Protocol was a conscious snub to the ICC’s 
authority, and aims specifically to protect African Heads 
of State and senior government officials from prosecution 
(Abraham, 2015). African Heads of States seem conflicted 
about the proper role they must play in exorcising the 
continent’s image from human rights abuses that have 
happened in the past and continue till this day. 
CONCLUSION
The Rome Statute of 1998 that led to the creation of the 
ICC had a noble purpose. The statute established four 
prosecutable core international crimes consisting of 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crime 
of aggression. Crimes of genocide and egregious human 
rights abuses that had occurred in Bosnia and Rwanda 
and several places in Africa precipitated action in setting 
up the ICC. The extraordinary success the ICC had in 
prosecuting high-ranking officials in Africa such as Jean-
Pierre Bemba of Central African Republic and Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo of the DRC emboldened it to go after 
more highly-prized targets like Laurent Gbagbo who 
served as Cote d’Ivoire’s president from 2000 to 2011. 
Other than Gbagbo’s supporters who were incensed, the 
AU and African political incumbents did not raise much 
objection to the ICC having him extradited to The Hague 
and putting him on trial. Apparently, emboldened by the 
success in arresting Gbagbo, the ICC went ahead in 2012 
to charge Uhuru Kenyatta, then Kenya’s Deputy Prime 
Minister and Minister of Trade, for crimes associated 
with Kenya’s 2007 elections. Even though President Al 
Bashir was first charged for genocide in 2008, it was not 
until 2015 when the ICC made the most concerted effort 
through the government of South Africa to arrest him.
African governments acting collectively through the 
AU believe that the revolt they have begun against the 
ICC is legitimate. In the eyes of these leaders, the ICC 
pursuing incumbent leaders such as the President of 
Kenya for prosecution was overambitious. Furthermore, 
the ICC putting the Zuma government in an untenable 
circumstance by importuning him to arrest his colleague, 
Al Bashir, became the straw that broke the back of many 
African leaders to reconsider their relationship with the 
ICC. They reasoned that if they did not express their 
disapproval vociferously through an unusual action 
such as threatening to withdraw their membership, the 
international community would not take them seriously. 
Besides, the ICC being oblivious to pursuing leaders 
in other parts of the world who have committed human 
rights abuses did not escape notice. By badgering the 
ICC with threats of withdrawal and invectives for its 
actions, the AU has given notice to the ICC to reevaluate 
its policy of singularly pursuing African leaders for 
wrongdoing. The people of Africa may be worse off 
for it, but the AU and many African leaders believe 
they have been fighting to preserve their legacy and the 
continent’s dignity.
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